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Resumo
A emergência da direita nacionalista em Portugal 
nas eleições legislativas de 2019 é aqui contextua-
lizada nos fenómenos populistas europeus do mes-
mo tipo nas décadas mais recentes e na geografia 
do descontentamento que lhes está associada. A 
análise da territorialização da votação nesse novo 
partido, o Chega, na escala municipal, apresenta 
um padrão que não se coaduna com o que tem sido 
a geografia eleitoral em Portugal desde a Revolu-
ção Democrática de 1974, sugerindo as correlações 
com um conjunto alargado de variáveis com uma 
forte motivação identitária da sua base eleitoral, 
que aparece associada a alguns elementos de des-
vantagem social e económica. Simultaneamente, a 
sociologia dos eleitores do Chega apresenta alguns 
aspetos surpreendentes em face do que se sabe 
para a generalidade dos casos europeus.
Palavras-chave: geografia eleitoral; geografia do 
descontentamento; Portugal; direita nacionalista; 
populismo europeu.
Abstract
The emergence of the nationalist right in Portugal 
in the legislative elections of 2019 is contextualized 
here in the framework of similar populist phenomena 
that have emerged in Europe in recent decades and 
in the geography of discontent associated with 
them. An analysis of the territorialization of the 
votes for this new party, named “Chega” (Enough), 
at the municipal level presents a pattern that does 
not match what electoral geography has been in 
Portugal since the 1974 democratic revolution. The 
correlations with a wide range of variables point to 
base voters associated with some elements of social 
and economic disadvantage and strongly motivated 
by identity issues. At the same time, the sociology 
of Chega voters presents some surprising aspects 
when compared to what is known about most 
European cases.
Keywords: electoral geography; geography of 
discontent; Portugal; nationalist right; European 
populism.
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Introduction
At the beginning of the 21st century in Europe, 
it became increasingly evident that the 
challenge to the current political-economic 
regime was no longer a minor phenomenon 
limited to the fringes or small parties of 
the political-electoral system and that this 
challenge has become increasingly important. 
Such process was based on left and right-wing 
parties and resulted from resentments that are 
not always easy to identify.
The challenge of the left has traditionally 
been directed at socioeconomic injustices 
related to capitalism in general and in recent 
decades to neoliberalism in particular. In 
addition, there is an increasing concern with 
forms of subordination based on different 
identity elements (e.g., gender, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation). Despite progresses 
towards a greater equality of principles 
and alter-globalization proposals, this left-
wing challenge has not been able to call into 
question the architecture of the international 
political economy system on which globalism 
rests and on which predatory formations are 
articulated (Sassen, 2014, p. 13), formations 
that ensure the concentration of wealth to 
the top of the income pyramid and allow the 
global system to function.
As far as the right is concerned, there is a 
discourse that challenges that architecture, or 
at least part of it, especially if it is a right with 
more nationalist, sometimes fascist-inclined 
characteristics. Therefore, this challenge rests 
on issues related to national sovereignty, 
culture and identity, normally considered in 
a static and monolithic way, although it is 
also associated with socioeconomic aspects. 
In this sphere, it emphasizes the negative 
consequences of  global izat ion on the 
employment and the income of vast sectors of 
the populations of many European countries, 
sometimes with a typically left-wing economic 
agenda (Gordon, 2018, p. 95). 
It was this right, above all, that recently 
has had the most success with voters, 
particularly the losers of globalization, and 
managed to grow consistently in the most 
advanced European countries and in many 
peripheral ones, of which Portugal is an 
example. 
The parties of the new nationalist 
and anti-systemic right have been able to 
obtain support mainly among older, white, 
working-class voters with a low income and 
low qualification, who, therefore, find it more 
difficult to prosper in the current European 
economy, according to several studies on 
this phenomenon (Dijkstra, Poelman and 
Rodríguez-Pose,  2019; McCann, 2019; 
Gordon, 2018; Guilluy, 2014). The voters with 
these characteristics are common people, 
grassroots citizens, who are among those who 
have lost the most with the evolution of the 
European economy in the last decades; this 
loss has been characterized by an increasing 
deindustrialization in many regions and 
countries and by the increasing importance 
of the services sector. In Portugal, the anti-
system and/or populist vote with a significant 
dimension and parliamentary representation 
was the left-wing vote until recently, as we will 
discuss in detail below. However, in the 2019 
legislative elections, a right-wing party with 
a speech and a political proposal that can be 
framed within the nationalist and populist 
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right, the Chega party, presented itself for the 
first time to voters and managed to elect a 
deputy to the Assembly of the Republic (AR): 
André Ventura, its founder. In its political 
manifesto, Chega is depicted as “a national, 
conservative, liberal, and personalist party” 
(Chega, s/d).
I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  r e c e n t 
reconfiguration of the European political-
electoral framework, in which parties with 
these conditions have gained relevance and in 
some cases put the hegemony of traditional 
forces at risk, the election of a deputy of a 
party with these characteristics in Portugal1 
soon after it appeared for the first time in 
elections to the AR is of particular significance. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the 
reasons behind this first electoral success. 
Subsequently, in the legislative elections of the 
Autonomous Region of the Azores in 2020, this 
party was the fourth most voted, obtaining just 
over five percent of the votes, and managed to 
elect two regional deputies.2 
This result allowed Chega to negotiate 
parl iamentary support for a coal it ion 
government led by the second most voted 
party (the center-right Social Democratic 
Party), thus removing the Socialist Party 
(center-left) from the Regional Government. 
This party was the most voted but did not 
obtain the absolute majority in Parliament. 
More recently, the Chega party leader, André 
Ventura, ran for the presidential election on 
January 24, 2020, and came in third place (out 
of seven candidates), obtaining around half a 
million votes (11.9%), which has confirmed 
the ongoing growth process around its party. 
Several polls carried out in 2020 and in the 
beginning of 2021 have reported more than 5% 
of vote intentions for Chega in new legislative 
elections, sometimes approaching 10% of 
votes. This result would place Chega as one 
of the three or four major Portuguese parties. 
With this in mind, this study aims to contribute 
to the understanding of the geography of this 
phenomenon in Portugal and to discuss the 
factors that underlie the detected patterns.
In this context, the objective we propose 
here is to analyze the electoral results of the 
Chega party in the 2019 legislative elections 
from a geographical perspective. Therewith, 
we aim to (1) understand the political-electoral 
origins of its voters, (2) analyze its main 
socioeconomic characteristics considering 
short-term territorial transformation dynamics, 
and (3) identify possible similarities and 
differences with voters who have supported 
parties and movements of this type in other 
European countries.
To reach these objectives, we analyzed 
variables of an electoral, social, and economic 
nature using linear correlation and multiple 
linear regression. The data were obtained from 
the National Statistics Institute (INE), the High 
Commission for Migration (ACM), the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs (MAI), and the Immigration 
and Borders Service (SEF). The period we 
chose for analysis was 2015 to 2019, the years 
of the last two legislative elections in Portugal. 
However, some structural social and economic 
variables are from 2011, the year of the last 
census in Portugal. These temporal differences 
posed challenges to this study; however, they 
did not make the analysis unfeasible.
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The rise of the nationalist 
right, populism, and “places 
that do not matter” in Europe
The advance of anti-system             
movements in Europe
The first major milestone of the challenge 
to the political and economic regime in force 
in Europe happened in 2005, when two 
electoral defeats of the central parties of the 
system occurred. In that year, the European 
Constitutional Treaty, which called for a 
Constitution for the European Union, was 
refused in a referendum in France (54.67% of 
nay votes) and in the Netherlands (61.54% of 
nay votes). Indeed, the challenge to the system 
was older, by both the left and the right; 
although extreme right parties, compared to 
extreme left parties, have historically obtained 
less votes. The first electoral success of the 
current anti-system right was perhaps that of 
the French National Front, founded in 1972 
(renamed “Rassemblement National” in 2018). 
It managed to elect its leader, Jean-Marie Le 
Pen, as a Member of the European Parliament 
in 1984. However, this challenge never 
reached the point of changing the positions of 
EU leaders, in opposition to what happened 
following the 2005 referendums.
After rejecting the Constitutional 
Treaty, other electoral acts marked the 
rise of parties in several countries that 
challenged the integration to the EU, aspects 
of the socioeconomic system, and often the 
“shrinking” of national sovereignty and a 
supposed loss of identity. These parties have 
associated immigration to Europe and the 
presence (even if consolidated) of immigrant 
communities and their descendants with 
several of these processes. The maintenance 
of the Fidesz party in power in Hungary since 
2010, with Viktor Orbán as prime minister, is 
an example of the success of this nationalist 
identitarian right, authoritarian to a certain 
degree, mixed with some skepticism towards 
the EU. In Poland, this phenomenon has been 
led by the Law and Justice party (PiS).
The year 2016 was an important 
turning point due to the victory of “no” in 
the referendum on the United Kingdom's 
permanence in the European Union and the 
election of Donald Trump as President of the 
United States, a phenomenon that clearly 
fits in with what we describe here. The latter, 
because of the worldwide influence of the 
United States, has given new momentum 
to such movements in Europe. In the 2016 
Austrian presidential elections and in the 
2017 French elections, candidates from the 
nationalist right came in second; in Germany, 
also in 2017, the rise of the AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland) in the legislative elections made 
it difficult to organize a majority in support of a 
new government.
Populism and its recent success in the right
A n c h o re d  m a i n l y  o n  t h e  r i g ht ,  t h i s 
phenomenon has been called “populism,” 
by which new political parties adopt an 
insurgent discourse against hegemonic forces 
in the sociopolitical system. It focuses on the 
concerns of most of the European popular 
classes and often adopts a simplistic and 
superficial language in their messages. In 
fact, the concept of populism is not clear. It 
is subject of controversy in political science 
(Lisi, Llamazares and Tsakatika, 2019; Dijkstra, 
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Poelman and Rodríguez-Pose 2019, pp. 3-4; 
Gordon, 2018, p. 97; Mudde, 2004, p. 541). 
The definition that seems most accepted 
is the one that regards populist parties as 
establishing a dichotomy between the people 
and an allegedly selfish elite that is distant 
from the rest of the population. That elite is 
sometimes corrupt, thus creating a dichotomy 
between an “us,” the people, and a “them,” 
the leaders, regarded as enemies of ordinary 
people (Bonikowski, 2017; Mudde, 2004). 
Another possible definition is that which 
regards populism as the rejection of the moral 
and intellectual authority of the ruling class, 
replacing it for common-sense responses of 
popular classes (Gordon, 2018, pp. 97).
Populism can be considered an ideology, 
as Mudde (2004) posits, but this too is 
controversial. It can also be considered a 
form of political mobilization or a discursive 
framework (Bonikowski, 2017), or just a 
“political logic – a way of thinking about 
politics” (Judis, 2016, p. 14). The definition 
of populism as the transposition of the 
opposition between two poles – the people 
and an elite – to the party level was expanded 
by Judis (ibid.), who argued for a type of 
populism that also opposes the people to a 
third group that, in Western societies, may be 
immigrants and ethnic or religious minorities. 
This type of populism categorizes society into 
three groups and is therefore called “triadic.” 
I f  left-wing populisms tend to defend 
the people against the elite in a vertical 
perspective and can thus be designated as 
“dyadic,” right-wing populisms, namely the 
contemporary European nationalist right, 
in addition to this opposition, also tends 
to incorporate the opposition between 
the people and other groups considered 
to be outside the supposedly traditional 
and original national society and are even 
regarded as a threat to it. 
The opposition between “people” and 
“elite,” or between “people” and “ruling class,” 
may invoke different groups and/or specific 
powers, such as ethnic or socioeconomic 
groups, Wall Street and international finance, 
or European technocratic elites (Freire, 
2019a). Note that some of the oppositions 
are related to issues of the right; others evoke 
issues of the left. This allows understanding 
why Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, pp. 5-6) 
classify populism as “a thin ideology”3 or “a 
low-density ideology” (expression preferred by 
the Portuguese political scientist André Freire).
The lack of ideological-programmatic 
density of populism implies that it does not 
provide complex and wide-scope solutions 
to important political issues from the outset; 
for this reason, populism is almost always 
associated with other ideological concepts 
and elements. Thus, populism may take very 
different programmatic forms. An example 
of this polymorphism is the idea, proposed 
by Mouffe (2018), of a populism that renews 
the left, against neoliberal hegemony, and 
compatible with liberal democracy. Here, 
populism is regarded as a way of doing politics, 
not as an ideology (Freire, 2019b).
For populist ideas to acquire a political-
electoral relevance, there must be political 
movements that promote them and run for 
elections, and that a substantial part of the 
electorate must be willing to accept and vote 
for them. One of these elements may precede 
the other to a greater or lesser extent, and it 
is possible that they feed themselves back. 
Having some predisposition for this populism 
among the electorate may lead to the 
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emergence of parties that support it, which, 
in turn, may expand their electoral base by 
amplifying these ideas in the public debate.
The populist parties that have emerged, 
or that from a given moment have grown 
rapidly, sometimes did so on the basis of 
politicians who are entrepreneurs (Gordon, 
2018,  p.  98)  and expressly  mobi l ized 
themselves to attract the vote of popular 
discontent that people felt existed in society 
and to which the traditional parties of the 
system did not respond. The reasons for this 
popular discontent have often been attributed 
to the ruling classes’ disinterest in what 
happens to the people. Sometimes, there 
seems to be an entrepreneurial approach by 
which a group of politicians decide to embody 
popular discontent, as if it was a market 
opportunity. 
Reasons for voter adhesion
Adherence to these ideas seems to be based 
on two orders of reasons that are reflected 
in a successful electoral discourse. On the 
one hand, growing economic difficulties, with 
loss of income and even of jobs, have been 
affecting a substantial part of the population 
(Dijkstra, Poelman and Rodríguez-Pose, 
2019; Ferrão, 2019), without the prospect of 
reversing the situation in the current context. 
On the other hand, many people feel forsaken 
or even marginalized and threatened from 
a political, cultural, and even identitarian 
point of view, especially when economic 
difficulties coexist with strong migratory 
currents, be it the local population leaving 
in search of job opportunities or the entry of 
foreign population, which sometimes occurs 
simultaneously. This generates fear or even 
a feeling of loss of identity, which may be 
reinforced by the post-materialist agenda on 
the part of metropolitan populations. 
This transformation has been closely 
linked to neoliberal globalization, which has 
led to a wide opening of European economies 
to international trade, investments, and 
capital circulation. This situation led to a large 
increase in the import of cheap agricultural 
and industrial goods, in the latter case mainly 
from Asia, and allowed an important part of 
European industrial groups to start producing 
in Asia goods they used to produce and sell 
in Europe, goods that sometimes they also 
exported. Obviously, this has drastically 
reduced industrial employment in Europe, 
mainly affecting less qualified and older 
working people, who in Europe are largely 
white and among those who have been 
designated as “losers of globalization” in 
Western developed countries.
If the internationalization of goods and 
capital markets has been more intense than 
that of labor markets, the latter is also essential 
to ensure the profit and competitiveness 
of economic sectors, relying on workforce 
segmentation (according to gender, ethnicity, 
geographic origin) and on the reduction of 
its costs. If the most qualified immigrants are 
essential to ensure creativity and innovation 
in sectors such as R&D or telecommunications 
in developed countries in Europe, the 
least qualified immigrants ensure labor 
supply to sectors with limited geographical 
transferability and marked by seasonality or 
by strong susceptibility to cyclical crises (e.g., 
agriculture, civil construction and public works, 
hotels) (Malheiros, 2012). In this context, the 
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recruitment of foreigners becomes frankly 
desirable and increases competition with 
national workers, thus helping to feed the anti-
immigrant discourse that assigns to foreigners 
– and not to the conditions of the economic 
system and to employers – the responsibility 
for deteriorating the life conditions of the 
national workers.
However, voting in right-wing nationalist 
parties in Europe has also been linked to 
issues of behavior on the part of voters 
towards a set of values related to attitudes 
towards immigrants,  mult icultural ism, 
authority, and distrust of national and 
international governance, often without an 
explicit relationship with economic insecurity 
(Inglehart and Norris, 2016, apud Gordon, 
2018, p. 98). These people tend to consider 
their values and feelings of identity threatened 
by the sharing of their daily living spaces with 
culturally different immigrant communities, 
especially Islamic ones, mainly when the 
growth of the latter is recent and fast (Ferrão, 
2019, pp. 62-63) and feelings of economic and 
social loss are heightened.
In some regions, this situation diluted 
the feeling of living in a homogeneous nation-
state with its own, falsely static values and 
identities, generating a strong reaction on the 
part of certain segments of the population. 
The populist right not only takes advantage 
of these feelings, but indeed nourishes 
them, which is contrary to the social-liberal 
consensus and the acceptance of the cultural 
diversity principles, which have been hitherto 
dominant.
For Fukuyama (2019), the economic and 
nationalist dimensions have been combined by 
right-wing populism to reinforce nationalisms. 
Right-wing populism has managed to take 
advantage of the resentment of a working 
class that has lost jobs due to, for example, 
subcontracting and competition with foreign 
populations in globalized capitalism. In this 
way, resentment ends up displacing the 
effects of capitalism to the foreign population, 
disseminating discourses based on national 
identity and sometimes hate speech. 
Thus, the populist vote (especially on 
the right) is also a cultural refusal of the post-
materialist agenda, but which has strong 
material consequences for Europeans in the 
most fragile social classes in terms of income 
and the sociocultural environment into which 
they have become territorially embedded. 
In fact, Gordon (2018, p. 109) found a 
relationship between recent immigration 
and populist support among workers of small 
establishments, and between long-term 
changes in the composition of the population 
and support for populist parties by long-term 
residents in affected regions. These people 
are “localists who see in the territory, in their 
territories, in the places where they live, the 
last anchor of social capital, of the sociability 
they have left and of the security to which they 
aspire” (Ferrão, 2019, p. 63).
The revolt of the “places that don’t matter” 
and the geography of resentment
Several  geographers have studied the 
phenomena of electoral insurgency in the 
context of the populist vote and in the context 
of the anti-European Union vote (which partly 
coincides with the populist one, but not 
entirely). They have come to the conclusion 
that this type of electorate is often more 
concentrated in some places than in others. 
This has given rise to a new geography, the 
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geography of discontent or resentment – 
the expression adopted in this issue of the 
Cadernos Metrópole. What these places have 
in common is that they are poor or declining 
areas and often have been neglected for a 
long time by political power, to the point it has 
made them feel  as “places that don’t matter” 
– the expression used by Rodríguez-Pose 
(2018) – from the point of view of economic 
and social development.
Neoliberal globalization has resulted, in 
Europe and other places, in the strengthening 
of some forces that act towards the divergence 
of socioeconomic development at the regional 
scale, mainly through international trade 
(Madeira, 2019). In general, there has been a 
strengthening of large metropolitan centers 
and a decline (relative or absolute) of the most 
peripheral regions.
In Western Europe, these problems 
affect mainly regions with small and medium-
sized industrial cities, which have suffered 
a decline in employment or income, and 
also their surrounding suburbs and rural 
areas, where income has stagnated (Martin 
et al., 2018, p. 9). This is associated with a 
combination of declining income per capita 
compared to the national averages, job losses, 
and declining labor force. 
Part of these regions had once been 
prosperous; the reality of a decline (absolute 
or relative) in the last few decades may have 
given their populations an increased sense 
of loss in relation to areas that have always 
ranked below the average regarding income 
and/or job loss. These places that don’t 
matter, or “places that don’t count” (Ferrão, 
2019), have remained in this situation not only 
because of the dynamics induced by neoliberal 
globalization, but also because of the absence 
of regional development policies strong 
enough to counter them (Madeira, 2019). 
Voters in these places began to revolt at 
the ballot boxes, and this phenomenon took on 
increasing dimensions, as mentioned above, to 
the point of calling into question the political 
and economic order that has prevailed in the 
last four decades. Rodríguez-Pose (2018) called 
it “the revenge of the places that don’t matter” 
against the feeling of being left behind. 
The causes of these electoral revolts 
are already generically identified in Europe. 
Detailed analysis were written for national 
cases, such as the French and the British 
ones, essentially confirming these trends. In 
France, the increase in inequality resulting 
from globalist neoliberalism has led to a social 
fracture between more localized popular 
classes and globalized elites, and the electoral 
options tend to be different (Guilluy, 2014). 
In the UK, such electoral uprisings have 
concentrated heavily on territories that have 
suffered prolonged declines (McCann apud 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). This was evident in the 
territorial patterns of votes for the UK to stay 
or to leave the European Union in the 2016 
referendum.
Methodology
The research developed in this study considers 
the Portuguese municipal scale.4 European 
and national elements, whose background can 
be found in the global framework of globalist 
neoliberalism, support the analysis developed 
here. The more comprehensive discussion 
focused on Europe aims to present the 
characteristics and the evidences of the rise 
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of a right-wing nationalism, in order to frame 
the recent emergence of this phenomenon 
in Portugal, clearly amplified by the arrival 
of a Chega member at the Assembly of the 
Republic in the 2019 elections. 
The information used to analyze the 
case of Portuguese municipalities is based 
on a set of secondary data of a quantitative 
nature obtained from the National Statistics 
Institute (INE), the High Commissariat for 
Migration (ACM), the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (MAI), and Foreigners and Borders 
Service (SEF). Part of this data was obtained 
from the Pordata portal, which organizes and 
processes these data. The time frame extends 
from 2001 to 2019 due to the diversity of 
the variables chosen in the three defined 
dimensions: electoral, sociodemographic, 
and economic. The rationale for choosing the 
temporality of the various variables was based 
on obtaining the most recent information 
available (representation of the current 
situation) combined with data from a relatively 
closer earlier time (very recent dynamics and 
transformation trends). This resulted in the 
collection of data from the last two legislative 
elections in Portugal (2015 and 2019), from the 
last two Population Censuses (2001 and 2011), 
and from some social, demographic, and 
economic variables for other years between 
2009/2010 and 2019 (Table 1). 
For the framework analyses aiming 
at understanding the national electoral 
evolution, the two decades of the present 
century were considered, covering the last 
six legislative elections: 2002, 2005, 2009, 
2012, 2015, and 2019. The variables included 
in the socio-demographic and economic 
dimensions intend to help to explain the 
municipal geographic pattern of votes for 
Chega in 2019, interpreted somewhat as a 
“geography of discontent.” The choice of 
variables considered the elements discussed 
in the previous section and took into account 
indicators that are in line with those that in 
Europe have been associated with the process 
analyzed here.
Evidently, these indicators were adapted 
to the specific situation of Portugal, not 
only due to the nature of the information 
available, but also to consider particular 
social and economic aspects. We emphasize, 
for example, the choice of the variable gypsy 
population residing in Portugal (Mendes, 
Magano and Candeias, 2014), considering 
that the speech of the elected deputy of 
Chega took advantage of a secular prejudice 
suffered by this population to construct an 
electoral narrative that reinforced stereotypes 
against those individuals. Therefore, it is 
relevant to understand possible effects of 
such process. The calculation for the gypsy 
population was based on a sample of 113 
councils5  in mainland Portugal, since there is 
no information available for the rest of them. 
The set of 52 characterization and short-
term dynamics indicators (variation rates) was 
subjected to two statistical analyses using the 
software IBM SPSS 24: Pearson's correlation 
and multiple linear regressions. Although a 
correlation matrix of all variables was built, 
the vector that included the correlation of 
each indicator with the percentage of votes 
obtained by Chega in the 2019 legislative 
elections, considered as the dependent 
variable, was retained as the fundamental 
analysis process. The variables with the highest 
(in module) and most significant correlation 
were considered for analysis, using correlation 
coefficients (R) higher than 0.34 as a reference. 
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Dimension Variable Year
Electoral
% of valid votes for Chega 2019
% and rate of variation of valid votes (PS, PSD*, PCP**, PNR, CDS*, IL, PAN and BE) 2015-2019
% and rate of abstention variation 2015-2019
Sociodemographic
% Resident gypsy population*** 2014
% Female population 2011
% Illiterate Individuals**** 2011
% Individuals with schooling up to the 9th grade 2011
% Individuals with secondary education 2011
% Individuals with higher education 2011
% Illiterate individuals and schooling with up to 9th grade 2011
% Young resident population (15-29 years) 2011
% Adult resident population (30-64 years) 2011
% Elderly resident population (65 and over) 2011
% Foreign population 2019
% Non-EU foreign population 2019
Variation rate Foreign population 2010-2019
Variation rate Non-EU foreign population 2010-2019
Variation rate Total resident population 2001-2011 and 2009-2019
Ageing index 2001, 2011, 2015 and 2019
Variation rate Aging index 2015-2019 and 2011-2019
Economic
% Employed population in the secondary sector 2001 and 2011
% Unemployed***** 2011, 2015 and 2019
% (index number) Purchasing power per capita 2017
Beneficiaries of Social Insertion Income 2015 and 2019
% Employed population 2001 and 2011
Variation rate Unemployed 2011-2015 and 2015-2019
Variation rate Beneficiaries of Social Insertion Income 2015-2019
Variation rate Employed population 2001-2011
Variation rate Employed in the secondary sector 2001-2011
Table 1 – Variables used in correlation and multiple regression analysis
Sources: INE, SEF, ACM, MAI.  
* The PSD and CDS parties ran in the 2015 elections as a coalition. Thus, we consider the two parties together for the 
2015-2019 variation.
** The PCP party runs under the acronym CDU in coalition with a small ecological party that has never run for 
elections alone.
*** Data existing only for 113 municipalities in mainland Portugal; the remaining municipalities were excluded from 
the calculation of this correlation, which therefore considers only 113 units of analysis.
**** Data on education levels refer to individuals aged 15 or over.
***** The unemployment figure includes only unemployed people registered in employment and vocational training 
centers and not the total number of unemployed people.
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The correlation analysis was repeated 
considering only the 109 municipalities in the 
southern half of Portugal, given the relevance 
of an analysis that considered in addition to the 
national group, only municipalities belonging 
to seven districts located in that area (Lisbon, 
Santarém, Portalegre, Évora, Setúbal, Beja, 
and Faro) because of the over-representation 
of votes for Chega detected there. This same 
analysis was carried out for the gypsy resident 
population considering only the 47 councils in 
this region that had such information. 
Next, the variables were subjected to 
a multiple regression model in which the 
percentage of votes for Chega in the 2019 
elections was still the dependent variable, 
and all other electoral, sociodemographic 
and economic variables were combined 
as independent variables. This model, 
which allows assessing how certain sets of 
independent (most significant) variables 
combine to  “expla in”  the dependent 
variable, has been reproduced for the set of 
municipalities in the south. 
The mapping of Chega's electoral results 
represents the municipal location quotients 
(LQ),6 which allows verifying the over- and 
under-representation of the results of this 
party by municipality in comparison with 
the national average (1.3% of the votes). The 
spatialization of LQs was performed using 
ArcGIS 10.6 software.
The choice of the methodological 
strategy for the analysis of aggregated data 
(in political science, also known as "ecological 
methodology" or "ecological analysis") 
adopted here results from being the only 
one simultaneously possible and feasible to 
achieve our objectives. An eventual collection 
of individual data by a survey of Chega 
voters in 2019 would require a large amount 
of resources. In addition, it would be very 
uncertain that, if contacted by pollsters, these 
voters would agree to reveal their vote and 
would be sincere about their motivations.
Thus, individual data are territorially 
aggregated and correlated with the vote 
for Chega in the 2019 legislative elections, 
which was also used as a dependent variable 
in a multiple regression. These procedures 
are involved in the discussion about the 
“ecological fallacy” (Freire, 2001, pp. 33-43; 
King, 1997, pp. 3-34), whose risks in these 
cases are spurious correlations and collinearity 
between variables, respectively. The significant 
correlations considered for analysis (R > 0.34) 
did not reveal any signs of this problem and the 
correlation matrix of all independent variables 
did not point to a significant collinearity in 
most cases. Moreover, it is known that, in most 
analyses in social sciences and geography, it 
is common the existence of  some degree of 
correlation between variables that does not 
affect the results of the final model, and may 
even assist in some interpretation processes. 
Chega in the Portuguese 
political party system: 
political discourse, electoral 
results, and interpretation
The Portuguese political party system and the 
emergence of Chega
Until recently, the Portuguese party system 
remained essentially similar to the one 
formed after the Democratic Revolution 
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of April 1974, which overthrew the fascist 
regime of the Estado Novo. In 1975, elections 
were held for a Constituent Assembly, which 
approved the Constitution of the Republic 
under the new regime. In 1976, the first 
legislative elections were held. In these two 
elections, the PS and PSD (then PPD, Popular 
Democratic Party) emerged as the two main 
parties in Portugal, consolidating themselves 
as the “center” of the regime, a situation that 
still prevails. Also, since 1975-76, the PCP and 
CDS-PP emerged alternately as the third and 
fourth parties, which remained so until 2009, 
when the Left Bloc overtook the PCP for the 
first time. In that year, the PCP was the fifth 
most voted party.
Until recently, the only important 
and consistent change to the system had 
been the appearance of the Left Bloc (LB) in 
1999 (see Table 2). That year, it elected two 
deputies and in the following elections, it 
started a growth trend that placed it in the 
same order of magnitude as that of the PCP 
and CDS. However, in the 2015 legislative 
elections, the party system showed important 
signs of change. That year, an animalist-
environmentalist party elected one parliament 
member and managed to elect four in 2019. 
Also in 2019, three other parties elected their 
first member to Parliament, including Chega, 
which meant a significant diversification of the 
represented political formations.
In 2015, another aspect of the political 
party system changed. Since the Carnation 
Revolution of 1974, the governance of 
Portugal has been in the hands of the PS 
and the PSD alternately or in coalition, and 
sometimes in coalition with the CDS-PP. This 
group of parties was, until then, known as "the 
arch of governance" because they were the 
only ones that effectively governed. Until then, 
the PS had never agreed to form a coalition 
with parties to its left in the Parliament, 
nurturing, in a framework antagonistic to the 
PCP, a historical fracture that referred back to 
the end of the revolutionary period in 1975. 
In addition, the existence of some stances 
regarded as incompatible in matters such 
as Portugal's international commitments, 
economic policy orientation, labor protection, 
or the level of state intervention in the 
economy have prevented possible coalitions, 
not only with the PCP, but also with the BE.
The 2015 legislative elections were 
held after a period of intense economic and 
financial crisis that triggered a neoliberal 
auster i ty  response by  the r ight-wing 
government (PSD-CDS coalition) and caused 
unemployment to skyrocket, reduced wages, 
and provided less social protection. So, the 
PS refused to support a right-wing minority 
government7 and for the first time negotiated 
a parliamentary support with the PCP and 
the Left Bloc for a minority government of 
its own. That party proposed to reverse, in a 
progressive and mitigated way, some policies 
imposed in the previous quadrennium, 
for example in the areas of wages, social 
protection, and urban transport. This fact – 
the appointment for the first and only time 
in the history of Portuguese democracy of a 
prime minister not belonging to the political 
force that won the elections, but with the 
support of a majority negotiated in Parliament 
– is the third element of rupture associated 
with the 2015 elections (Freire, 2017).
In the Portuguese Republic that emerged 
from the Revolution of April 25, 1974, voters 
elect by universal and direct suffrage the 
deputies that make up the Assembly of the 
The geography of the nationalist right in Portugal
Cad. Metrop., São Paulo, v. 23, n. 51, pp. 469-498, maio/ago 2021 481
Republic (also known as “Parliament”). These 
deputies are included in the lists of political 
parties running for each election. These lists 
are organized by district constituencies,8 
circles from the autonomous regions of the 
Azores and Madeira, and emigration. Each 
constituency elects a number of deputies 
determined according to the number of voters 
(except for emigration) using the proportional 
method of Hondt.







Chega Nationalist and Populist Right 1.29 1 2019
National Renewal 
Party (PNR)* Conservative Nationalist Right 0.33 0 *
Liberal Initiative Right-wing liberalism in all domains 1.29 1 2019
CDS-PP Conservative Right – Christian Democracy 4.42 5 1976
Social Democratic 
Party (PSD) Center-Right Economic Liberalism 27.76 79 1976
People-Animals-
Nature (PAN)
Animalist party with an inclination 
towards the left 3.32 4 2015
Socialist Party (PS) Democratic socialism/social-democracy (center-left) 36.34 108 1976
Free Left libertarian with tendency towards democratic socialism 1.09 1 2019




Communism 6.33 12 1976
Table 2 – Political parties with parliamentary representation in 2019
Source: prepared based on information from party websites and the Ministry of Internal 
Administration (SGMAI, 2019)
* The PNR never elected members of the Parliament. It was included in this list because of its 
ideological proximity to Chega and because the voting correlation of these two parties was 
greater than that of any party with parliamentary representation with Chega.
** Since 1987, the PCP has run for national elections associated with a small ecologist party, the PEV, 
which has never run on its own in legislative elections.
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The recent emergence of Chega and 
of other small parties that elected members 
of the Assembly of the Republic can be 
regarded as the result of a trend of electoral 
erosion of the central parties in the political 
system of European countries. This electoral 
erosion has occurred concomitantly with 
the rise of nationalist right-wing parties 
and parties with thematic causes, such 
as environmentalism and animalism, and 
sometimes also of left-wing parties that 
challenge neoliberal hegemony. This has 
resulted, for example, in the Greek and 
French socialist parties having ceased to 
have their traditional central roles in the 
system and becoming secondary actors.
In  Portugal ,  th is  t rend has  a lso 
manifested itself in legislative elections since 
the beginning of the 21st century. The total 
number of votes for the PS and PSD decreased 
from almost 80% of the valid votes in 2002 to 
67.4% in 2019 (see Figure 1). 
Note that considering valid votes as a 
reference reflects in higher percentages than 
considering voters (which also include blank 
and null ballots) or registered voters. In the 
case of voters, the percentages decrease by 
two to three percentage points compared to 
valid votes. However, in case the reference is 
registered voters, the sum of the votes for the 
PS with that for the PSD is 48.6% in 2002 and 
31.1% in 2019.
Figure 1 - Erosion of the political party core in Portugal
at the beginning of the 21st century
Source: Ministry of Internal Administration (SGMAI, 2019).
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In this context, the fact that Chega 
ran for the first time in the 2019 legislative 
elections and immediately elected its founding 
president, André Ventura, as a deputy by 
the Lisbon electoral district is of particular 
significance, because Chega is a party with 
a speech and political proposals that can be 
framed within the nationalist and populist 
right, which has grown rapidly in many 
European countries. In its Founding Political 
Manifesto (Chega, s/d), the party assumes 
itself as “national, conservative, liberal, and 
personalist.” In some recent polls, its voting 
intentions have grown much higher than the 
1.29% it previously had at the national level.
In Portugal, until recently, the anti-
system and/or populist vote with a significant 
dimension and parliamentary representation 
was the left-wing vote for the Portuguese 
Communist Party (PCP) and for the Left Bloc 
(considering a broad sense of populism), which 
together obtained 10 to 15% of the votes (with 
fluctuations) in the elections for the Assembly 
of the Republic. 
The PCP, founded in 1921 with a Marxist-
Leninist orientation, can be regarded as a 
typically anti-system party. It makes a wide 
range of criticisms and alternative proposals 
to the status quo, with emphasis on economic 
policy guidelines and the interventionist role 
of the State. The Left Bloc, which has focused 
its criticism not so much on the system but on 
its problems and the life difficulties of various 
segments of the population, is a result of the 
re-foundation and merging of small parties of 
the so-called "radical left" that incorporated 
“new” orientations associated, for example, 
with the diverse dimensions of subordination 
(gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age 
structure) that go beyond exploitation based 
on the positioning of individuals in the 
economic system (social classes) and that 
value identity aspects. 
In their speeches, both call attention to 
the great inequalities existing in Portugal and 
sometimes call for an opposition between 
ordinary people (the people, in a more 
monolithic sense in the case of the PCP and 
in a more diversified sense in the case of the 
BE) and the ruling classes and plutocratic 
interests, which can be framed within the left 
dyadic populism. Moreover, in an analysis of 
the electoral programs of the main parties 
between 1995 and 2015, Lisi and Borghetto 
(2018) classified as populist 29.4% of the 
paragraphs of the PCP's program and 17.9% 
of the paragraphs of the Left Bloc program, 
compared to 18.6% and 4.3% of their programs 
in 2015, respectively.
Main aspects of Chega's proposals               
and electoral speech in 2019
The identification of Chega as a party that is at 
the same time “national, conservative, liberal, 
and personalist” can be problematic, as some 
of these pillars are potentially conflicting with 
each other. For example, in its 2019 Political 
Program (Chega, 2019), the party defines itself 
as both liberal and conservative, which may be 
contradictory. This is ultimately not the case 
because Chega has an ultraliberal economic 
program and a conservative identity and 
customs views.
Regarding its proposals, the liberal 
dimension of Chega is mentioned at the 
beginning of its Founding Political Manifesto. It 
states that the party "was born to reduce the 
State to its minimal essential functions." This 
idea is specified in its 2019 Political Program, 
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which advocates, for example, the extinction 
of the Ministry of Education so that the State 
has only an arbitration role in education, 
extending this logic to higher education, for 
which privatization of public universities is 
advocated. Similarly, it says that the State 
"should not, ideally, interfere as a provider 
of goods and services" in health and should 
not have positions in companies, without 
proposing an economic strategy.
However, the fact that has most famously 
distinguished Chega from the other parties, 
and that has had the most media impact, is 
its conservative and identity discourse. At the 
same time that it highlights the role of the 
Catholic Church in the structuring of European 
and Portuguese civilizations and praises a 
supposedly unified and static national identity, 
it stigmatizes some specific ethnic groups 
(e.g. gypsies) based on the replication of 
stereotypes. 
Thus, in its Founding Political Manifesto, 
the party aims to “prohibit political and 
religious practices that offend the Portuguese 
legal system and the European cultural 
roots, in particular antisemitism, gender 
ideologies, the application of Sharia, excision, 
forced marriages of minors, inhibition of 
minors' attendance to minimum compulsory 
education, racism of any nature, among 
other current – and unpunished – practices 
in communities that, after all, benefit from 
State assistance without complying with 
the applicable legal and general provisions” 
(Chega, s/d). In these examples, in addition 
to mixing elements with diverse and even 
contradictory contents (“gender ideology” 
and “racism of any nature,” but criticizing 
the support of the State to members of 
some communities, in addition to implicitly 
stigmatizing and even adopting a xenophobic 
attitude in relation to the gypsy community) 
and identifying challenges, the party is 
nonetheless not concerned with considering 
transformation trends and depreciate public 
policies that are empowering and towards 
social change. 
In parallel, and also in line with what has 
been the discourse of the nationalist right in 
other European countries, Chega states that 
“it will prioritize its action in the fight against 
the 'politically correctness,' the corruption of 
interests, institutionalized censorship, illegal 
immigration, weaknesses in border control, 
and the growing impunity for organized and 
violent crime.”
In fact, André Ventura rose to national 
political celebrity in 2017, when, as part of 
his campaign as a candidate, by the PSD, to 
be president (mayor) of the municipality of 
Loures, he made statements in which spoke 
about the impunity of gypsies and stated 
that they lived almost exclusively of public 
subsidies. He also referred to them as being 
often generators of troubles, situation that 
media tend to report with some frequency 
(it was the case, for example, of the attack 
on a fire station in Borba in 2019 by a group 
of local gypsy people).9 Recently, regarding 
the COVID-19 epidemic, he proposed that 
a specific containment plan be adopted for 
the gypsy community (because supposedly 
there was a systematic violation of restriction 
rules imposed on the entire population 
by segments of the gypsy community, as 
reported by the media).10 This population has 
lived in Portugal for at least five centuries. 
The lack of social recognition has resulted, 
in the past and in the present, in practices 
and discourses of discrimination and racism 
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that clearly have hindered processes of 
approximation between gypsies and the 
majority of the Portuguese population 
(Mendes, Magano and Candeias, 2014).
Voting for Chega by municipality in 2019
The vote for Chega in the legislative elections 
that took place on October 6, 2019, presents 
a surprising territorial pattern, judging 
by what has been the geography of the 
traditional division between the left and the 
right inherited from the foundation of the 
democratic regime. The right has been stronger 
in the North and the left has been stronger 
in the South. As early as 1975, this division 
resulted from the vote for the four parties 
that structured the democratic political party 
system. They presented a clear geographic 
distribution that has tended to keep its main 
characteristics, although they began to blur in 
the following legislative elections (Gaspar and 
André, 2018, pp. 160-164).
The vote for the PSD presented a 
strong North-South dichotomy, with some 
exceptions in the North of Alentejo and 
Algarve. This same dichotomy occurred 
with the vote for the CDS-PP, but with more 
dispersed areas of influence (due to the 
smaller size of this party) and a greater 
difficulty in penetrating the South (Gaspar, 
André and Honório, 2018, pp. 102-108). The 
PS presented a less concentrated pattern than 
that of the other three parties. The insertion 
was stronger in the Tagus Valley and in the 
Algarve, and also in industrial areas of the 
Center and the North Coast, also associated 
with urban voting. This has been one of its 
main characteristics. Note that the Left Bloc, 
which has asserted itself since 1999, also has 
a concentrated voting in urban centers. For 
its part, the PCP vote was historically more 
concentrated than that of the other three 
parties mentioned, essentially in Alentejo 
and in some municipalities of the Lisbon 
metropolitan area, even in a context in which 
it has suffered a slow and prolonged trend of 
loss of electoral support.
The map of location quotients of 
the vote for Chega by municipality reveals 
precisely that it is in the South, up to the Tejo 
Valley (inclusively), that this new right-wing 
populist party obtains votes above its national 
percentage (Figure 2). This area extends to the 
municipalities of the west coast to the north 
of Lisbon, even to areas close to Coimbra and 
some municipalities of the Beira Interior, but 
with lower values than those recorded further 
south. The municipalities with the highest 
incidence of votes for Chega are mainly located 
in the Alentejo, especially in the inland, in the 
metropolitan area of Lisbon, in the Tejo Valley 
and in the central and western Algarve. This 
pattern coincides to some extent with that of 
the Portuguese Communist Party. This overlap 
with a party that is ideologically the opposite to 
Chega raises interesting questions for analysis. 
It should be emphasized, first of all, a common 
aspect of these two parties: both are regarded 
as phenomena that reflect discontent towards 
a system that fails in providing answers to 
people (e.g. parties known as “the arc of 
governance” up to 2015).
In addition, the vote for the PCP is 
usually classified as a “protest” vote (as well 
as the vote for the Left Bloc and other small 
parties). This has obvious resonances with the 
geography of discontent based on the vote 
for right-wing populist parties, based on clear 
phenomena of rejection of the system.
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Figure 2 – Location quotients of the valid votes for Chega
in the elections for the Assembly of the Republic, 2019
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Explanatory hypotheses for the municipal 
voting standard for Chega: significant simple 
linear correlations and multiple regression 
with electoral, sociodemographic, and 
economic variables
The simple linear correlation between the 
percentage of votes for Chega by municipality 
in the October 2019 legislative elections and 
a set of electoral, sociodemographic and 
economic variables resulted in significant 
Pearson coefficient values for 13 variables 
(see Table 3). Unsurprisingly, the greatest 
correlation was with the vote for the National 
Renewal Party (0.56), a small nationalist right-
wing party with extreme-right ideas established 
twenty years ago through the re-founding of a 
pre-existing dying small party; PNR had never 
managed to obtain electoral success or elect 
any member to the Parliament. Naturally, the 
programmatic similarity between both parties 
explains the strong correlation between the 
territorialization of their votes.
As mentioned in the analysis of the 
municipal voting map, the relatively high and 
positive correlation between the territorial 
patterns of voting for Chega and for PCP is 
noteworthy (the latter competes under the 
acronym CDU by colligating with a small 
ecological party, the PEV). Such a coefficient 
of correlation of 0.42 is the only positive and 
strong one of Chega with an important party in 
the Portuguese political system.
Pearson’s Correlation
% National Renewal Party (PNR) (2019)
Abstention variation rate 2015-2019
% of population aged 15 and over with secondary schooling (2011) 
% of gypsy population
% vote for the Portuguese Communist Party-PEV-2019 party







% vote for the Social Democratic Party (PSD) (2019)
% employed population in the secondary sector (2011)
Aging index variation rate (2011-2019)
Aging index variation rate (2015-2019)
Left Bloc (BE) vote variation rate  (2015-2019)
% of population aged 15 and over with schooling up to the 9th year








% of votes for Chega (2019): Dependent variable
Table 3 – Significant correlations with municipal voting for Chega,
mainland Portugal
** Significant correlation at 0.01 (bilateral).
Source: authors’ calculations using data from INE and MAI.
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Conversely,  the municipal  voting 
pattern for Chega in 2019 also has a relatively 
strong, but negative (-0.55) correlation with 
the vote for the PSD, that is, the higher the 
concentration of votes for the PSD, the less 
votes for Chega. It also has relevant negative 
correlations with the 2015-2019 variation of 
votes for the Left Bloc (-0.43) and PS (-0.36). 
However, this is expected: the higher the votes 
for Chega, the less the growth of the Bloc and 
PS, parties whose principles are opposed to 
those of Chega.
Finally, still in the domain of electoral 
variables, there was a strong correlation (0.53) 
between the variation of abstention in 2015-
2019 and the vote for Chega. This indicates 
that the party achieved a greater penetration 
in municipalities where the percentage of 
voters who give up voting has grown the most. 
Bearing in mind that abstention in Portugal 
may often be interpreted as a passive protest, 
in the sense of giving up in face of the system, 
this is another indicator that associates voting 
for Chega with voters' discontent and with 
protest votes, along with the correlation with 
the vote for the PCP.
Among the socio-demographic variables, 
the strongest correlation (0.47) occurs with 
the percentage of population that completed 
secondary education; inversely, there is a 
negative correlation with the percentage of 
population with an education level below the 
9th grade. Considering that in Europe the vote 
on the populist right tends to be higher among 
the less educated, these data do not fully 
support such relation for the Portuguese case. 
The same idea emerges from the important 
negative correlations of voting for Chega by 
municipality and the variation in the aging 
index between 2011 and 2019 (-0.47%) and 
between 2015 and 2019 (-0.41), since studies 
at a European level have indicated a trend 
towards a greater penetration of this type of 
party among older voters. 
The positive correlations of voting 
for Chega with the percentage of resident 
foreigners (0.34) and above all with the 
percentage of the gypsy population (0.46) 
are not surprising, taking into account what 
is known of other countries. This aspect is 
particularly significant due to the emphasis 
given by the party leader to issues related to 
this ethnicity since he asserted itself in the 
Portuguese political-media space.
Of the variables of economic nature 
tested, only the percentage of population 
employed in the secondary sector has a 
relevant correlation (-0.48) with the vote for 
Chega by municipality. However, this is an 
important variable in light of what is already 
known about the geography of discontent in 
Europe, as the vote for the anti-system right is 
associated with a long-term economic decline 
in industrial regions.
These elements allow confirmation of 
a geographic association between the Chega 
vote and the political-electoral discontent 
due to its overlapping to both the communist 
vote and the recent rise in abstention. This is 
related to the presence of a foreign population 
and a Portuguese gypsy population.11 At the 
same time, in places where there is more 
industry, the vote for Chega tends to be lower.
The coincidence between the greater 
electoral penetration of Chega and the 
presence of foreign population and the 
Portuguese gypsy population is in l ine 
with some data from the 2019 Portuguese 
Electoral Study analyzed by Magalhães (2020). 
According to the author, an overwhelming 
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majority (88%) of voters of Chega considers 
that “minorities should adapt to the customs 
and traditions of Portugal” (compared to 
63% among voters of other parties in 2019), 
while 62% argued that having Portuguese 
ancestors is "very important" to be "truly 
Portuguese" (compared to 36% among voters 
of other parties in that same year). However, 
this coincidence must be interpreted with 
caution because we are facing a very recent 
phenomenon and because, in that same 
Electoral Study, 88% of the voters of Chega 
stated that “immigrants are good for the 
Portuguese economy” (compared to 63% of 
voters of other parties) and 25% stated that 
immigrants increase crime rates, less than 
the 28% of voters of the other parties and 
significantly less than the 35% of abstainers 
who expressed the same opinion.
As a complement to the analysis of 
Pearson's correlation coefficients, the multiple 
regression model built to test the association 
of the percentage of votes obtained by 
Chega with electoral, sociodemographic, 
and economic variables, now considered 
jointly, essentially confirms the way by 
which some already highlighted political 
and sociodemographic variables combine to 
explain the municipal voting pattern in Chega 
(Table 4). 
In political terms, the percentage of votes 
for the PNR and the abstention rate variation 
continue to stand out. They are assumed to 
be the variables with the greatest explanatory 
power, and which are incorporated in the first 
two steps of the model. This confirms the 
ideological dimension of the Chega vote (the 
extreme right populist nationalism sharing 
space with the PNR) and the element of 
protest and discontent with the system, which 
can be inferred considering the contribution of 
the variation in the percentage of abstention 
to explain the Chega results. It should be noted 
that the absence of other political variables 
Model 
(stage) Variable R R
2 Adjusted 
R2   
1 % National Renewal Party (PNR) (2019) 0.555 0.308 0.305
2 Abstention variation rate (2015-2019) 0.670 0.448 0.444
3 Aging index variation rate (2011-2019) 0.703 0.495 0.489
4 % of Beneficiaries of Social Insertion Income (2015) 0.735 0.541 0.534
5 % of population aged 15 and over with secondary education (2011) 0.760 0.577 0.569
6 % of Beneficiaries of Social Insertion Income (2015) 0.785 0.616 0.608
7 Employed in the secondary sector variation rate (2001-2011) 0.800 0.640 0.630
Table 4 – Stepwise multiple regression (successive results)
(Dependent variable: percentage of votes for Chega in the municipalities
of mainland Portugal in the 2019 Legislative Elections)
Note: according to the F test, all variables included in these steps are significant at 0.05.
Source: authors’ calculations using data from INE and MAI.
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in the set of variables considered as more 
significant in this multivariate model, with 
emphasis on the percentages of votes for the 
PSD and PCP-PEV,12 which record a relatively 
high correlation coefficients, although with 
different inclinations, with the percentage 
of votes obtained by Chega in 2019, justifies 
further refinement in the analysis of these 
simple links. Such a study is worth conducting 
in the future with the support of more 
information on effective voting transfers. Even 
so, it is worth noting that the correlations 
between the percentages of votes obtained by 
these two parties in 2019 and the variation in 
the percentage of abstention between 2015 
and 2019 are stronger (although positively 
in the case of the PCP-PEV and negatively 
in the case of PSD) than the correlations 
between the aforementioned percentages 
and the percentage of voting for Chega in 
that election. As the variable corresponding 
to abstention is one of the strongest in the 
model, its redundancy with the percentages of 
votes for the PSD and PCP-PEV not only helps 
to explain the reduction in their statistical 
significance in the multiple regression, but 
also draws attention to the fact that any 
links or transfers of votes between these 
constituencies implies an analysis of the role 
of abstention in the process.
Regarding the sociodemographic and 
economic dimensions, the results of the 
model confirm the apparent originality of 
the Chega voters' profile in face of what 
studies carried out on similar parties in other 
European countries have detected (younger 
voters with somewhat higher qualifications 
in the case of Portugal). However, the fact 
that it is a “pioneering vote” (it was first time 
the party ran in elections) justifies caution in 
this comparative analysis. Still regarding the 
social sphere, in the combined framework of 
explanations for the vote in Chega, the model 
incorporates, albeit indirectly (via variables 
associated with Social Insertion Income), 
the proportion of the gypsy population13 
and, broadly, the proportion of population 
in a situation of dependency and strong 
social disadvantage. Indeed, a speech with 
a xenophobic character particularly aimed 
at the gypsy ethnic group, which, as we have 
seen, systematically posits an association 
with subsidy dependency, seems to find 
echo among voters residing in municipalities 
where the population that benefits from 
the RSI is higher. It is easy to associate this 
situation with gypsies, even if they mean 
a very low percentage of the group of 
beneficiaries. 
The southern half of Portugal as Chega's 
preferred electoral landscape: brief 
contributions to an interpretation
When we consider the correlations between 
the vote for Chega by municipality and the 
variables analyzed only in relation to the 
municipalities in the southern half of Portugal, 
it is clear that significant correlations with 
variables of an electoral nature lose weight at 
expenses of correlations with socioeconomic 
variables (see Table 5). In that part of Portugal, 
where Chega obtained the highest results, 
the correlation with the communist vote is 
no longer important and the correlation with 
the PNR vote is weaker. The correlation with 
the presence of the gypsy population is even 
stronger than that of the country's total, but 
the correlation with the presence of a foreign 
population is no longer relevant.
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At the same time, the variables most 
related to economic difficulties gain weight. 
There are significant correlations with the 
percentage of beneficiaries of Social Insertion 
Income (poor population) and the unemployed 
population, and a negative correlation with 
industrial employment. In addition, significant 
correlations with education levels disappear, 
and such correlations emerge with the young 
population (positive) and the aging index 
(negative).
These particularities of Chega's results 
in areas where it obtained a more expressive 
voting seem to indicate a greater weight of 
economic problems in voters' motivations. 
However, such problems can be interpreted as 
related to the presence of recent immigrant or 
Pearson’s Correlation
% of gypsy population
% of Beneficiaries of Social Insertion Income (2019)
% of Beneficiaries of Social Insertion Income (2015)
% Unemployed population (2019)
Variation rate for PAN (2015-2019)
% Abstention (2019)
% young population 15-29 years (2011) 













% of votes for Chega (2019): Dependent variable
Table 5 – Significant correlations with municipal voting
for Chega in Portugal’s southern municipalities
** Significant correlation at 0.01 (bilateral).
Source: authors’ calculations using data from INE and MAI.
gypsy populations, as is conveyed by the right-
wing triadic populist discourse. In addition, 
as we mentioned earlier, the stereotype that 
associates Social Insertion Income with people 
of gypsy ethnicity highlights precisely this type 
of connections. 
The multiple regression applied to the 
same variables, considering the percentage of 
votes for Chega as the dependent variable, for 
the set of municipalities in the southern half of 
Portugal (Table 6) confirms the greater weight 
of variables related to economic difficulties, 
with emphasis on the RSI and the association 
with industrial employment, which follows 
an inverse relation (the more relevant this 
association, the lower the percentage of votes 
for Chega). 
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However, in this multivariate model, 
the electoral variables make interesting 
contributions. The percentage of votes for 
the PNR remains as the strongest indicator, 
albeit losing meaning in view of the model 
that considers all municipalities in Portugal. 
In addition, as elements of the combined 
explanation for the percentage of votes 
obtained by Chega in the municipalities of the 
southern half of Portugal, the model integrates 
the variation rates (2015-2019) of votes for two 
relatively young parties (Left Bloc and PAN). 
These votes can be regarded as protest votes 
and are often associated with particular rights 
(e.g., of specific social groups, of animals). 
Note that Pearson's simple linear correlations 
between variations in the percentage of each 
of these parties and the percentage of Chega 
have a different meaning. There is a negative 
value in the case of BE (geographic patterns 
have elements of antithesis to each other) and 
positive in the case of the PAN (the patterns 
show overlapping elements). Finally, the 
percentage of votes for the PCP-PEV is the last 
independent variable of the model. It confirms, 
for the area of Portugal where the Communist 
Party has traditionally been more established, 
some proximity to the Chega voting pattern 
compared to the value obtained for the set 
of municipalities in Portugal. However, such 
proximity has to be analyzed in connection 
with other variables considering the decrease 
in Pearson's correlation between these two 
indicators. 
Model 
(stage) Variable R R
2 Adjusted 
R2
1 % of Beneficiaries of Social Insertion Income (2019) 0,472 0,223 0,215
2 % National Renewal Party (PNR) (2019) 0,632 0,400 0,389
3 Left Bloc (LB) variation rate (2015-2019) 0,684 0,468 0,453
4 % employed population in the secondary sector (2011) 0,707 0,500 0,481
5 % of Beneficiaries of Social Insertion Income (2019) 0,726 0,526 0,504
6 PAN variation rate (2015-2019) 0,740 0,547 0,521
7 % of vote for the PCP-PEV (2019) 0,753 0,566 0,536
Table 6 – Stepwise multiple regression (successive results)
for municipalities in the south of Portugal
(Dependent variable: percentage of votes for Chega in the 2019 Legislative Elections)
Note: according to the F test, all variables included in these steps are significant at 0.05.
Source: authors’ calculations data from INE and MAI.
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Conclusion
Chega began to assert itself in the Portuguese 
political party space showing some specific 
characteristics in comparison to similar 
phenomena in other European countries. 
One of these characteristics is that its 
political program is radically neoliberal from 
an economic point of view and marked by 
contradictions regarding the insertion of 
the Portuguese economy in international 
arrangements that are potentially harmful to 
parts of the population. For example, regarding 
the European project, the explicit support 
written in party documents and declared by its 
leader is contradicted by criticisms regarding 
the control of the national economy by the 
most advanced EU countries, which, among 
others, could imply an action of recovery of 
autonomy in currency issuing (Marchi, 2020).
The discourse axis of Chega that most 
resembles this new nationalist right is the 
identitarian, showing a clear and strong 
conservative concern. This identity dimension, 
along with the dichotomy between the people 
and a ruling class considered to be oligarchic, 
and between the “true” Portuguese and 
foreigners and members of non-Portuguese 
ethnic groups ( in particular the gypsy 
population), makes Chega an example of the 
right-wing triadic populism that has grown in 
Europe in recent years.
The electoral geography of Chega, at 
least in the legislative elections of October 
2019, proved to be counterintuitive in relation 
to what has been the territorial pattern of 
right-wing parties in Portugal. This is because 
Chega’s greatest penetration has occurred in 
areas (southern half of Portugal) where the 
left-wing vote, especially the communist one, 
has historically had the greatest strength. 
The positive correlation of the vote for 
Chega by municipality with the vote for the 
PCP (represented by the CDU), considering 
mainly the growth of abstention, confirms 
the idea that Chega’s voters are mainly from 
socioeconomic groups that are unhappy 
with, or resentful of, the difficulties of daily 
life and the political party system, as has 
happened in other European countries. Such 
discontent, which also takes advantage of 
some electoral demobilization in other fields, 
both on the right (in the case of the CDS, 
a Christian and conservative party) and on 
the left (for example, in the area of the PCP), 
also appears related to identity issues. This 
emerges through strong correlations with the 
percentage of foreign population and, above 
all, the gypsy population in each municipality.
It should be noted that the socio-
demographic variables most correlated with 
the vote for Chega point to a somewhat 
atypical sociology of its voters compared 
to what has been found in studies on this 
phenomenon in most European countries. 
This is because there are negative correlations 
with the less educated population and with 
the recent increase in the aging index. This 
atypical sociology is corroborated by the 
multiple regression model applied to the set of 
electoral, social, and economic variables used 
to explain the percentage of votes for Chega in 
Portuguese municipalities. 
L e s s  o b v i o u s l y,  t h e re  i s  a l s o  a 
relationship between the territorial pattern of 
voting for Chega and variables related to the 
lack of economic dynamism. Actually, there is 
less penetration of that party in areas where 
we find a higher employment rate in industry 
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and a stronger presence in the municipalities 
with the highest percentages of population 
that benefits from the Social Insertion Income, 
situation that becomes clearer in the case of 
the southern half of Portugal, where Chega 
had more votes. 
These results show that the geography 
of the vote for Chega is part of what has 
been called in Europe the geography of 
discontent, or resentment, with an electoral 
base that responds to the same type of 
motivations. Voters in this new party have 
sociodemographic features somewhat atypical 
in the European context, but their territorial 
distribution has a significant correspondence 
with that of variables characteristic of identity 
concerns and, to a lesser extent, of economic 
difficulties.
It should be noted that this attempt to 
outline a geography of discontent in Portugal 
took place when the phenomenon of a 
possible electoral revolt associated with the 
problems of sizeable population sectors was 
still embryonic. It began to become visible 
precisely in the elections whose results we 
analyze here. Considering that the whole 
context leads to the supposition of a possible 
rapid growth of Chega, the territorial pattern 
of its voting and some characteristics of 
its voter base may easily change in future 
elections.
Finally, it is necessary to mention 
two ana lys i s  l imi tat ions  that  just i f y 
further exploration in later works. First, 
the non-inclusion of socio-professional 
variables, namely considering professional 
status, disregards a potentially important 
complementary dimension to explain the 
geographic voting patterns detected. Secondly, 
the internal geographical diversity of many 
municipalities in demographic, social, and 
economic aspects, with emphasis on the largest 
and most urbanized ones, probably translates 
into lower correlation values between these 
types of variables and the electoral results of 
Chega. To obtaining clearer and more robust 
results one could treat information at the sub-
municipal level ("freguesias," communities), 
at least for a sample of municipalities where 
Chega obtained more expressive results. 
Unfortunately, because we initially felt the 
need to use an approach that combined more 
general components with a slightly larger scale 
of analysis (municipality), there was no longer 
any space left to detail the freguesia level, 
which we may do in a future study. 
The geography of the nationalist right in Portugal
Cad. Metrop., São Paulo, v. 23, n. 51, pp. 469-498, maio/ago 2021 495
[I] https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3206-5522








Universidade de Lisboa, Instituto de Geografia e Ordenamento do Território, Centro de Estudos 
Geográficos. Lisboa, Portugal.
jmalheiros@campus.ul.pt
Translation: this article was translated from Portuguese to English by Rafael Rocca.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Diogo Gaspar Silva for the technical support in handling statistical 
information and plotting the map, and Manuela Mendes for the useful information she provided. 
We are also thankful to the Center for Geographical Studies of the Institute of Geography 
and Spatial Planning of the University of Lisbon, funded by the Foundation for Science and 
Technology (FCT, IP), under the grants UIDB/GEO/00295/2020 and UIDP/GEO/00295/2020, for 
the financial support for the English translation of the manuscript. Finally, the authors express 
their appreciation to the anonymous reviewers for the valuable comments and suggestions, 
although the contents of the study and the ideas expressed in it are the sole responsibility of its 
authors. We also thank Rafael Rocca for the translation of the manuscript.
Notes
(1) Although Chega was the first political force within this ideological area to elect a deputy, this type 
of speech and orientation can also be found at the core of the National Renewal Party (PNR), a 
small political force that has run for parliamentary elections since 1999, despite never having 
managed to elect any parliamentarian.
(2) Available at: http://www.resultadoseleitorais.azores.gov.pt/Resultados.aspx. Accessed on: 
December 14, 2020.
(3) In the original: "More concretely, we define populism as a thin-centered ideology."
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(4) For reasons of analysis simplification, only the 278 municipalities in mainland Portugal were 
considered. This implied excluding the 30 municipalities in the insular autonomous regions of 
the Azores and Madeira.
(5) A council is a synonym for municipality.
(6) The LQs result from dividing the percentage of votes obtained by Chega in each municipality 
by the percentage of votes it obtained at a national level. This allows identifying the level of 
overrepresentation (values above the unit) or underrepresentation (values below the unit) of 
the votes recorded in each municipality.
(7) The PSD and the CDS, which governed Portugal in the previous legislature (2011-2015), ran as a 
coalition in the 2015 elections under the designation “Portugal à Frente” ("Portugal forward") 
and obtained the highest number of votes. This meant, within the framework of the principles 
of Portuguese politics, that the leader of this coalition was the first to be called in order to form 
a government. 
(8) In Portugal, districts are territorial units of a subregional scale created for administrative purposes. 
(9) Interview with André Ventura (Bugalho, 2017).
(10) Interview with André Ventura (Banha, 2020).
(11) Some foreign gypsies live in Portugal, mainly of Romanian nationality, but their number is 
insignificant compared to that of the Portuguese gypsy population.
(12) Note that the Pearson's correlation coefficient resulting from the association between the 
percentages obtained by these two parties at the municipal level in the 2019 legislative elections 
is quite high, although with a negative sign (-0.791). This indicates some redundancy between 
both patterns.
(13) Note that the variable referring to the gypsy population cannot be incorporated into these 
regression models because, as we have seen, there are only data for 113 units of analysis 
(municipalities) and not for all 278 units whose data are available for the remaining variables.
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